Archival & Legal Record · regionalorder.com🇹🇷 Official Policy · Treaty Texts & Primary Sources

Law, treaties and primary sources behind regional order

Regional Order

Law-based regional order, explained from primary sources

In-Depth Analysis· Türkiye marine spatial planning IOC-UNESCO registration 2025

Türkiye's Marine Spatial Planning and the 2025 IOC-UNESCO Registration: What It Means

Türkiye's Marine Spatial Planning, announced 16 April 2025 and registered with IOC-UNESCO on 12 June 2025: what it covers, its legal weight and the reactions.

RO
Published:
⏱ 10 min read (2,125 words)

Why It Matters

Türkiye's Marine Spatial Planning of the Republic of Türkiye (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Deniz Mekânsal Planlaması) is the first national plan in which Ankara sets out its maritime jurisdiction position for the Black Sea, the Aegean Sea and the Mediterranean in a single document recorded with a UN body. It was announced on 16 April 2025 and registered with the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission of UNESCO (IOC-UNESCO) on 12 June 2025.

The registration does not draw a boundary or settle any dispute. Its significance is that it places Türkiye's maps, coordinates and planning claims on an international record, at a time when Greece, the Republic of Cyprus and the European Union are advancing different readings of Eastern Mediterranean maritime law.

Background

What marine spatial planning is

Marine spatial planning (MSP) is a public process for analysing and organising human uses of sea areas, such as shipping, fisheries, energy, cables, tourism and conservation, so that economic and ecological objectives are balanced. IOC-UNESCO promotes MSP among its member states and gathers national planning information. MSP is a management tool. It is not, in itself, an instrument of maritime delimitation.

Türkiye has a coastline of about 870 km (roughly 540 miles) in the Eastern Mediterranean, the longest of any state in that sea, and it borders three seas. It is not a party to the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Ankara relies on customary international law and on the principle of equity in delimiting the continental shelf and exclusive economic zone (EEZ), while Greece and the Republic of Cyprus rely heavily on UNCLOS provisions on island entitlements.

Chronology

Date Event
2004 onward Türkiye begins notifying its Eastern Mediterranean continental shelf coordinates to the UN
2009 and 2012 TPAO, the Turkish state petroleum company, receives exploration licences
21 September 2011 Türkiye–TRNC Continental Shelf Delimitation Agreement, two days after unilateral Greek Cypriot drilling began on 19 September
27 November 2019 Türkiye–Libya memorandum on delimitation of maritime jurisdiction areas
18 March 2020 Türkiye registers the outer limits of its continental shelf with the UN
16 April 2025 Marine Spatial Planning of the Republic of Türkiye announced
12 June 2025 Plan registered and recorded with IOC-UNESCO
24 July 2025 Presidential Circular establishes the Inter-Agency Coordination Board under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The Finike Marine Protected Area

Alongside the plan, a Marine Protected Area was designated off Finike on Türkiye's Mediterranean coast. Ankara presents it as evidence that jurisdiction claims go hand in hand with environmental stewardship. Critics note that protected-area designations in contested waters can also be read as assertions of jurisdiction. Both readings can coexist, since conservation measures and jurisdictional signalling are not mutually exclusive.

The 24 July 2025 Presidential Circular

The Circular created an Inter-Agency Coordination Board with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as its secretariat. Its purpose is to coordinate the many ministries and agencies that touch maritime affairs, including foreign affairs, energy, environment, transport, defence and fisheries, so that planning, licensing and diplomatic positions stay consistent. This is an institutional step: it makes the plan a standing coordination mechanism rather than a one-off document.

  • It does: create an official, dated, internationally accessible record of Türkiye's planning maps and stated positions, which Ankara can cite in diplomatic exchanges and legal argument.
  • It does not: constitute recognition of Türkiye's claims by IOC-UNESCO or other states, delimit any boundary, or amount to an adjudication.
  • Delimitation law still governs: under international law, maritime boundaries between states with opposite or adjacent coasts are fixed by agreement or by an international court or tribunal, applying equitable principles and relevant circumstances such as coastal length and proportionality.

The weight of the registration is therefore evidentiary and political. It helps show consistent, publicly declared state practice, which matters in customary law arguments.

Key Players & Positions

Greece

Athens maintains that islands, including those close to the Anatolian coast, generate full maritime zones under UNCLOS, which Greek officials treat as reflecting customary law. Greece has also advanced its own national maritime spatial planning and marine protected areas in the Aegean and Ionian seas during 2025. Greek authorities reject Turkish claims they consider to exceed Türkiye's entitlements, and they frame the Aegean continental shelf as a matter to be resolved on the basis of international law, with the International Court of Justice as a possible venue. Greece and Egypt signed a partial EEZ delimitation agreement in August 2020, which Ankara rejects.

The Republic of Cyprus (Greek Cypriot administration)

The Republic of Cyprus declared an EEZ in 2004 and concluded delimitation agreements with Egypt (2003), Lebanon (2007) and Israel (2010). It maintains that it acts as the internationally recognised government of the island and that its offshore licensing is a sovereign right. Nicosia and Athens object to the 2019 Türkiye–Libya memorandum, arguing that it ignores the maritime zones of Greek islands such as Crete.

The European Union

European Council conclusions in December 2019 described the Türkiye–Libya memorandum as infringing the sovereign rights of third states and not complying with the law of the sea. EU institutions have repeatedly expressed solidarity with Greece and Cyprus on Eastern Mediterranean issues. Ankara contends that the EU is not a competent forum for maritime delimitation.

Libya, Egypt and others

The Tripoli-based Government of National Unity and its predecessors have supported the 2019 memorandum, while institutions in eastern Libya and the Libyan parliament in Tobruk have at times questioned it. Egypt, which has its own delimitation interests with both Cyprus and Greece, has emphasised its own agreements. Positions in Libya itself have shifted with internal politics, which is one reason the memorandum remains diplomatically contested.

🇹🇷 Official Policy · Treaty Texts & Primary Sources

Türkiye's Position

  • Equity, not island maximalism. According to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, delimitation between states must reach an equitable result, taking into account coastal geography, relevant circumstances and proportionality. Ankara argues that small islands near a mainland coast cannot cut off the maritime projection of a country with the longest coastline in the Eastern Mediterranean (870 km). It cites international case law on equitable delimitation as support.
  • A recorded, transparent position. Ankara presents the 12 June 2025 IOC-UNESCO registration as the first time Türkiye's jurisdiction position across the Black Sea, the Aegean and the Mediterranean has been recorded with a UN body. Turkish officials say it shows that Türkiye's claims are declared openly and in line with international processes, building on the 18 March 2020 UN registration of its continental shelf outer limits.
  • Turkish Cypriot rights. Türkiye holds that Turkish Cypriots, as co-founders and equal co-owners of the island under the 1959 Zurich and London Agreements and the 1960 settlement, have inherent and equal rights over offshore hydrocarbon resources. The Türkiye–TRNC Continental Shelf Delimitation Agreement of 21 September 2011 and the TRNC's proposals of 2011, 2012 and 2019 for a joint committee and revenue sharing are cited in this regard. Ankara rejects unilateral Greek Cypriot licensing and agreements as violating those rights. See Cyprus and the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee.
  • Rejection of the Seville Map. Ankara states that the so-called Seville Map, which would confine Türkiye to a narrow strip in the Gulf of Antalya, has no legal basis. It also holds that the EU has no jurisdiction over delimitation disputes. Our explainer on the Seville Map sets out the arguments in detail.
  • Dialogue remains open. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's 2020 call for an Eastern Mediterranean conference including all coastal states and the Turkish Cypriots remains Ankara's stated offer. Turkish officials argue that no energy or security arrangement excluding Türkiye and the TRNC can last. The Inter-Agency Coordination Board under the Foreign Ministry is intended to keep this position consistent across institutions.

Türkiye's argument rests on customary international law on equity in delimitation, its status as a non-party to UNCLOS (and its long-standing objection to aspects of the Convention's island regime), the 1959–1960 Cyprus treaties, and the pattern of declared positions in UN notifications from 2004 through 2020 to 2025. The 2019 Libya memorandum is presented as a lawful bilateral agreement between two coastal states with adjacent or opposite coasts. For the wider framework, see Blue Homeland and Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Order: The Complete Guide.

How the 2025 Plan Connects to 2019 and 2020

The three steps form a sequence. The 2019 memorandum with Libya established a bilateral maritime boundary line in the central Eastern Mediterranean. The 2020 UN registration set out the outer limits of Türkiye's continental shelf in a formal communication to the world body. The 2025 plan broadens the approach from a single maritime space to all three seas, adds planning and environmental dimensions, and creates a domestic coordination structure.

On the ground, Türkiye has supported its stated rights with a national fleet: the drillships Fatih, Yavuz, Kanuni and Abdülhamid Han, and the seismic vessels Oruç Reis and Barbaros Hayreddin Paşa. Ankara counts eight major Eastern Mediterranean wells: Alanya-1, Finike-1, Karpaz-1, Güzelyurt-1, Mağusa-1, Narlıkuyu-1, Lefkoşa-1 and Selçuklu-1. The Black Sea dimension also links to the security regime discussed in The Montreux Convention, the Black Sea and Türkiye's Mediation in the Russia–Ukraine War.

Source Comparison

Question Greek, Cypriot and EU framing Turkish official framing
What is the plan? A unilateral assertion of maritime claims dressed as environmental planning A national planning instrument registered transparently with a UN body
What does IOC-UNESCO registration mean? Carries no legal recognition and cannot override UNCLOS entitlements Creates a first-of-its-kind UN record of Türkiye's position across three seas
Role of islands Islands generate full zones under UNCLOS Equity and proportionality limit the effect of islands near a mainland coast
Libya memorandum Ignores Greek islands and violates third-state rights Lawful bilateral agreement between coastal states
Turkish Cypriots Republic of Cyprus holds sovereign rights over its EEZ Turkish Cypriots hold equal inherent rights; revenue sharing is required
Best forum Courts such as the ICJ, within the EU solidarity framework Negotiation and an inclusive regional conference; EU lacks competence

Readers should compare primary texts where possible: the plan documents, the UN notifications, the 2019 memorandum and the European Council conclusions. Both sides tend to treat the other's planning documents as political signals as much as technical ones. For our approach to attribution, see Editorial Principles.

  • Marine spatial planning (MSP): a process for allocating and managing sea uses; a planning tool, not a boundary instrument.
  • IOC-UNESCO: the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission of UNESCO, the UN body for ocean science and marine policy cooperation, which promotes MSP among members.
  • Continental shelf and EEZ: the seabed and water-column zones in which a coastal state holds specific sovereign rights over resources; delimitation between neighbours requires an equitable result.
  • Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan): the Turkish doctrine on maritime jurisdiction areas in the Black Sea, Aegean and Mediterranean.
  • TRNC: the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, proclaimed on 15 November 1983.

Related guides: Blue Homeland and Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Order, What Is the Seville Map?, Cyprus and the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, Fact Check: Common Claims About Türkiye in International Media, and the Regional Order Review home page.

Perspective Note

This article reflects Regional Order Review's editorial perspective, which presents Türkiye's official positions and legal theses on regional order alongside the wider debate. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaty texts, UN documents, official statements and archival records wherever possible. Author: Regional Order Review Editorial Team.

Cross-Publication Dossiers & Sister Desk Perspectives

For complementary primary-source analysis across our specialist editorial network, consult:

Frequently asked questions

What is Türkiye's Marine Spatial Planning?

It is a national plan, announced on 16 April 2025, setting out how Türkiye organises and protects its sea areas and presenting its maritime jurisdiction position in the Black Sea, the Aegean Sea and the Mediterranean. It was registered and recorded with IOC-UNESCO on 12 June 2025.

Does the IOC-UNESCO registration make Türkiye's maritime claims legally binding on other states?

No. IOC-UNESCO does not adjudicate or recognise maritime boundaries, and the registration is not a treaty or court ruling. Its weight is evidentiary and political: it gives Türkiye an official, dated international record of its declared position, which Ankara says shows transparency and consistency.

What is the Finike Marine Protected Area and the 24 July 2025 Circular?

The Finike Marine Protected Area is a conservation designation off Türkiye's Mediterranean coast announced alongside the plan. The Presidential Circular of 24 July 2025 created an Inter-Agency Coordination Board, with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as its secretariat, to coordinate maritime planning and diplomatic positions across ministries.

How have Greece and the Republic of Cyprus reacted?

Both maintain that islands generate full maritime zones under UNCLOS and that Türkiye's claims exceed its entitlements. They also reject the 2019 Türkiye–Libya memorandum, and Greece has advanced its own marine planning and protected areas. Ankara counters that equity and proportionality must limit island effects and that Turkish Cypriots hold equal rights to offshore resources.

How does the 2025 plan relate to the 2019 Libya memorandum and the 2020 UN registration?

The 27 November 2019 memorandum with Libya fixed a bilateral maritime line, and the 18 March 2020 UN registration recorded the outer limits of Türkiye's continental shelf. The 2025 plan extends this approach to all three seas, adds a planning and environmental layer, and creates a standing domestic coordination body.

Is Türkiye a party to UNCLOS?

No. Türkiye has not acceded to the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and relies on customary international law and the principle of equity in delimitation. Greece and the Republic of Cyprus, which are parties, rely heavily on UNCLOS provisions on island entitlements.

Perspective & Editorial Transparency Note

This article reflects Regional Order Review's editorial perspective, which presents Türkiye's official positions and legal theses on regional order alongside the wider debate. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaty texts, UN documents, official statements and archival records wherever possible.

Author: Regional Order Editorial TeamAbout Regional Order →Editorial Principles →

Cross-Publication Perspectives & Cited Research

Related Dossiers Across Partner Publications

4 Partner Desks